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 JUDGING EQUIVALENTS 
By Daryl Lim1 
Courts, patent attorneys, and legal scholars have wrestled with 
operationalizing the doctrine of equivalents for nearly 150 years. A venerable 
exception to normal patent infringement rules, the doctrine is deceptively 
simple to state—it enables patentees to reach beyond the literal wording of 
their claims, but it remains extremely controversial in its application. This 
Article traces the doctrine’s origins and explains the reasons for the doctrine’s 
incoherence, the tension between judges and juries, and the decline of the 
doctrine. This Article complements the doctrinal discussion with empirical 
findings of interest to academics and practitioners, including “equitable 
triggers” such as copying, design-arounds, and pioneer inventions. It also 
investigates limits such as prosecution history estoppel, the “all-elements” 
rule, the prior art bar and the public dedication rule.  
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Davison, John Duffy, Adam Mossoff, Michael Risch, Josh Sarnoff, Ted Sichelman, as well as 
participants of the 27th Annual Fordham IP Conference, and George Mason Center for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) 5th Summer Institute for sharing their valuable insights. 
Zhiwen “Jeannette” Jie provided valuable research assistance. All errors and omissions remain 
mine alone. This Article was supported by a summer research grant from the John Marshall Law 
School and by CPIP’s Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship program. I would like to thank 
Volume 36 of Santa Clara Law’s High Technology Law Journal, including Alexandra Green, 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Courts, patent attorneys, and legal scholars have wrestled with 
operationalizing the doctrine of equivalents for nearly 150 years.2 A venerable 
exception to normal patent infringement rules, the doctrine is deceptively 
simple to state—it enables patentees to reach beyond the literal wording of 
their claims, but it remains “extremely controversial” in its application.3 The 
United States Supreme Court employed the doctrine to protect patentees from 
those seeking “to evade liability for infringement by making only insubstantial 
changes to a patented invention,”4 warning that without it, patents would be 
“a hollow and useless thing” and “unscrupulous copyist[s]” would be 
“encourage[d].”5 Unfortunately, no doctrine “has produced more angst, 
controversy, or expense than the doctrine of equivalents.”6  
 
2 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956–57 (2007) (summarizing concerns that the doctrine “was 
swallowing the rule,” that it “ ‘lacks a coherent vision,’ ” that “[t]wo of the three most important 
Supreme Court patent cases decided between 1981 and 2005 concerned the scope of a limitation 
on the doctrine of equivalents . . . [with one] attracting more amicus briefs than any other Supreme 
Court patent case up to that date.”). See also Mircea A. Tipescu, Future Trends on the Doctrine 
of Equivalents?, LEXOLOGY (May 15, 2019), 
 https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0d00b2b9-ac39-4a9a-85f8-4bbf36a2e5ef; 
Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit: “The Doctrine of Equivalents Applies ONLY in Exceptional 
Cases”, PATENTLY-O (May 8, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/05/doctrine-equivalents-
exceptional.html (disagreeing on whether the 2019 Federal Circuit case of Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz 
Inc. was a “major step without precedential backing”). For significant scholarship on the doctrine, 
see Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: 
Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (Jan. 1989); R. Polk Wagner, 
Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159 
(2002); Matthew J. Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg & Mark A. Lemley, Foreseeability in 
Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of 
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004); David 
L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1157, 1177 (2011); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 428 
(2009) [hereinafter Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?]; Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of 
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371 (2010) [hereinafter Petherbridge, On the 
Decline]; Michael Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: 
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005); Doug Lichtman, 
Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013 
(2005); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (May 1990); S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the 
Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69 (2001).     
3 See infra Part II. Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1371 (“The doctrine of 
equivalents is a judicial creation that allows patentees to exclude others from the use of subject 
matter beyond the textual scope of a patent's claims. This venerable—and extremely 
controversial—doctrine is tolerated (or promoted) on the theory that it is fundamentally necessary 
to protect the incentive structure of the patent system.”).  
4 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002). 
5 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
6 Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1372. See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 
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As with transactional lawyering, patent claim drafting relies on attorneys 
identifying relevant contingencies and crafting words to mitigate risk as best 
as foreseeable.7 Patent attorneys refine their claims during prosecution and 
include alternative versions of the inventor’s original embodiment.8 The 
difficulty stems from the doctrine straddling an uneasy balance between 
giving patentees the full and fair scope of their rights and protecting public 
reliance on the express wording of patent claims, or what Professor Donald 
Chisum called the “Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum.”9 As he explained: 
There is clearly an interest in providing a clear definition of 
the scope of the patent right; lack of clarity can impede 
legitimate investment in technology-based products and 
services. On the other hand, strict and literal adherence to the 
written claim in determining the scope of protection can invite 
subversion of a valuable right and substantially diminish the 
economic value of patents.10 
Precision, however, comes at the cost of administrability. Whether 
something is “equivalent” to a patented invention is fact-specific and elides 
rote application of formulaic and mechanistic rules.11 Some commentators 
attribute its unruly scope to it being an “equitable” doctrine.12 Others have 
observed that the doctrine’s malleability makes it susceptible to biases.13 
 
1948 (“Perhaps no doctrine in patent law is as controversial as the Doctrine of Equivalents . . . 
.”).   
7 Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1948–49 n.3. 
8 Id. at 1952 (by “identifying and claiming the broadest patentable set of embodiments enabled by 
the disclosure in the patent specification.”). 
9 Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court's Warner-
Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection—Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA  COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1998). 
10 Id. at 6–7. See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1978 (“[C]ase law tries to strike an ad hoc 
balance between patent owners’ interests and costs to the public, including the cost of uncertain 
property rights.”).  
11 Jonathon Taylor Reavill, Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape of Equity in the 
Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 329 (1996). 
12 Gregory J. Smith, The Federal Circuit's Modern Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent 
Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 912 n.64 (1989) (“[C]ourts have justified the lack 
of usable guidelines for applying the doctrine by stating that it is an equitable doctrine, and to 
constrain it with rigid rules of application would compromise the court's equitable powers.”). See 
also Reavill, supra note 11, at 358 (“Without intent, the doctrine of equivalents is no more than a 
second stab at proving infringement for the patentee, and the doctrine loses both its equitable 
nature and its justification.”).  
13  See Reavill, supra note 11, at 365, 366 (describing juries as “pro-patent” and being prone to 
“idealize inventors.”). See also Robert L. Harmon, Seven New Rules of Thumb: How the Federal 
Circuit Has Changed the Way Patent Lawyers Advise Clients, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 573, 
582 (1992) (“Show the jury that beribboned patent document, and establish that the defendant is 
doing something pretty close to what is patented, and the question becomes not validity or 
infringement but simply how much?”).  
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The state of the doctrine of equivalents has been tied to “the health of 
patents” generally in the United States.14 At the same time, “no patent doctrine 
has been considered by the high Court more frequently than the doctrine of 
equivalents.”15 Patentees routinely invoke it in patent infringement cases.16 
Nowhere in patent law is uniformity more critical.17 It is uniformity that 
enables patentees and potential defendants to assess litigation outcomes in 
making investment decisions regarding research and development.18 Yet, the 
Supreme Court recognized that “the doctrine of equivalents, when applied 
broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the 
statutory claiming requirement.”19 Some of the fiercest criticism of the 
doctrine came from the Supreme Court itself. For instance, in his dissent, 
Justice Black warned that the doctrine would result in claim wording 
becoming “like a nose of wax, which may be turned and twisted in any 
direction . . . so as to make it include something more than, or something 
different from, what its words express.”20  
The doctrine’s unpredictability “frustrates and chills” attempts by rivals 
to legitimately design around patents fostering unnecessary litigation.21 Those 
“attempting to determine today whether a device is equivalent to a patented 
invention may know how the arguments on either side will unfold, but he is 
unlikely to be able to predict with any real certainty which of those sides is 
likely to prevail, and why.”22 This is problematic, not least because attorneys 
 
14 Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J., 
dissenting). See also James K. Folker, A Legislative Proposal to Clarify and Simplify Patent 
Infringement Analysis under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 211, 233 (1996) (“Both 
the lack of predictability and the inadequate public notice resulting from the current state of 
doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence have a number of serious repercussions on individual 
patentees and their competitors which, when considered industry-wide, may hinder innovation in 
the country as a whole.”).  
15 Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note, 2, at 1373. “Highly visible internal disputes and 
outcry from the bar have been paralleled by Supreme Court review in some of the Court's most 
famous patent cases of the modern era [since the creation of the Federal Circuit].” Id. at 1372-73.  
16 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 977 (“[A] patentee is almost always arguing the doctrine 
of equivalents as an alternative to a theory of literal infringement.”). Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A 
Normative and Positive Analysis of the Scope of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 7 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 281, 290 (1994) (“The doctrine of equivalents is frequently raised, typically in the 
alternative to a charge of literal infringement, in patent infringement actions.”). Tipescu, supra 
note 2 (“Claims of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents routinely accompany literal 
infringement claims in patent infringement litigation.”). 
17 Timothy J. Douros, Lending the Federal Circuit A Hand: An Economic Interpretation of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 322 (1995) (“Nowhere in the patent law is such 
uniformity more needed than in application of the doctrine of equivalents.”). 
18 Adelman & Francione, supra note 2, at 682. 
19 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
20 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
21 Adelman & Francione, supra note 2, at 683. 
22 Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 309–10. 
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have to settle most patent disputes and rely heavily on at least tolerably 
predictable rules to counsel on litigation avoidance and case settlement.23 
Rivals risk infringement and must “forecast how far a court relatively 
unversed in a particular technological field will expand the claim's language 
after considering the testimony of technical experts in that field.”24 
Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to 
introduce uniformity and certainty into patent law.25 Unfortunately the Federal 
Circuit, like the Supreme Court, has “failed to synthesize an articulable 
doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence,” notwithstanding many opportunities to 
do so.26 Former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel judged the doctrine 
“the most difficult and least predictable of all doctrines in patent law to 
apply”27 and admitted the court’s decisions on the doctrine had done little to 
increase the predictability of outcomes of disputes “litigated to conclusion 
through appeal.”28 His successor, former Chief Judge Randall Rader confessed 
that “[f]ew problems have vexed this court more than articulating discernible 
standards for non-textual infringement.”29 Case law on the doctrine is in 
disarray, with courts “analyz[ing] the facts on a completely ad hoc basis.”30  
 
23 Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of Patent Attorneys in Improving the Doctrine 
of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123, 124 (2000) (“Predictability is key — because with courts 
overburdened, patent lawyers will have to settle most patent disputes.”). See also Hilton Davis 
Chemical Co. v. Walter-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d 520 U.S. 17 
(1997) (Newman, J., concurring) (“[I]t will not serve that function if its application is so 
unpredictable that it cannot be relied upon. Indeed, the determination of technologic equivalency 
should be reasonably predictable by not only the innovator but also the competitor. When applied 
to a particular patented invention, it should be, reasonably predictable whether a specific device 
will be found “equivalent.”). 
24 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 617.   
25 Daryl Lim, I Dissent: The Federal Circuit's "Great Dissenter," Her Influence on the Patent 
Dialogue, and Why It Matters, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 873, 876 (2017).  
26 Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 290 (“The extended doctrine of equivalents debate has, therefore, 
generated far more heat than light.”). Id. at 309. See e.g. Sean T. Moorhead, The Doctrine of 
Equivalents: Rarely Actionable Non-Literal Infringement or the Second Prong of Patent 
Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1421, 1438 (1992) (“The Federal Circuit has not 
uniformly addressed the pioneer/non-pioneer issue.”). Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 
supra note 2, at 424, 428 (reporting that the law exhibits “noticeable heterogeneity,” with “court 
quite tolerant of jurisprudential diversity.”). As a normative matter, Petherbridge generally 
defends this heterogeneity, noting that it allows the court “the flexibility to reach what it sees as 
the ‘right’ result in most cases [but] could still promote uniformity of doctrinal development by 
utilizing a judiciary that is . . . highly skilled and capable of great nuance in interpreting patent 
law.” Id. at 429. 
27 Michel, supra note 23, at 123. 
28 Id. at 124 (“Today, as far as equivalent infringement goes, patent lawyers cannot with certainty 
predict dispute outcomes under the doctrine of equivalents.”). 
29 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(Rader, J., concurring). 
30 See Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 309. 
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The doctrine survived calls for legislative abrogation and despite its 
frustrating vagueness, is here to stay.31 What then can stakeholders do to 
mitigate its uncertainty while leveraging on its flexibility? According to some, 
“any effort to reconcile the myriad decisions into a coherent vision is 
Sisyphean.”32 The more optimistic argue that the problem lies not with the 
doctrine but rather its application, with fixing inherently ambiguous operative 
terms such as “substantially different” and “interchangeable” as the proper 
way forward.33  
The doctrine’s controversy and complexity allured many into attempting 
to unravel its mysteries. Most studies “simply catalog the various cases and 
highlight those facts that apparently were central to the finding, all in an effort 
to assist the attorney seeking a factual analogy.”34 Some, however, have taken 
a bolder leap forward, employing various approaches: Law and Economics,35 
mathematical,36 and empirical.37 While each method has its own merits, the 
rapidly growing field of empirical research in intellectual fuels the kind of 
evidence-based decision-making that until recently was lacking.38  
 
31 See Michel, supra note 23, at 124; see also D. Alan White, The Doctrine of Equivalents: 
Fairness and Uncertainty in an Era of Biologic Pharmaceuticals, 60 EMORY L.J. 751, 778 (2011) 
(“[A]bolishing the doctrine altogether would tilt the balance too far in the other direction, 
narrowing the scope of patent protection and reducing the incentives for firms to develop pioneer 
biologics in the first place.”). Craig Wallace, A Proposed Standard Jury Instruction for a Patent 
Infringement Inquiry Under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 10 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 425, 
427 (1994) (“While there has been criticism of the equivalents doctrine, the doctrine still applies 
today and does not appear to be in danger of abandonment.”). 
32 See also Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 309. 
33 Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 62 F.3d at 1535 (Newman, J., concurring) (“It is not the doctrine 
of equivalents, but the uncertainty of its application, that causes the uncertainty in commercial 
relationships.”). 
34 Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 309. 
35 See Douros, supra note 17, at 330. 
36 See Raj S. Davé, A Mathematical Approach to Claim Elements and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 
16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 507 (2003). 
37 See Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, supra note 2, at 1301 (covering Federal Circuit 
decisions over a “fifteen-year period spanning [January 1, 1992 to May 2, 2007.]”). See also 
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 963 (covering “every district court and court of appeals 
decision on the doctrine of equivalents that appeared in Westlaw and was decided during three 
eighteen-month periods[]” between 1999 and 2005); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1183 (examining 
cases between 1991 and 2008). See generally Darcy August Paul, The Judicial Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 247, 248 (2003) (covering the period between 1999 to 2002).  
38 Hon. Ryan T. Holte & Ted M. Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107, 160 
(2019) (describing how “empirical studies are typically more reliable than anecdote[.]”); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 510 (2015) 
(“How do rules concerning such issues as patent duration, the requirement of nonobvious subject 
matter, enablement, or the doctrine of equivalents perform in the market? There is very little 
empirical study of how individual patent doctrines perform[.]”). For some examples of notable 
empirical studies in intellectual property law, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of 
Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2002). See also Allison & Lemley, supra note 2; 
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Against this backdrop, this Article provides an empirical basis for 
judges, scholars, policymakers, and patent attorneys to better understand the 
doctrine’s nature in order to contextualize its evolution and chart its future. It 
surveys the law and literature on the doctrine from its inception over 150 years 
ago to the present day, and reports on contemporary results that will interest 
these stakeholders. It tests conventional wisdom against 10,373 observable 
datapoints gleaned from 316 Federal Circuit and district court cases between 
2009 and 2018, including Rule 36 summary affirmances with no opinion.39  
By coding the reasoning in each case, this Article reveals how district 
courts and the Federal Circuit employed the doctrine. Patent litigators would 
be interested in practical questions such as what arguments are most likely to 
win? What role do factors like litigation venue, industry, and posture have on 
outcomes? The descriptive statistics in this Article provide useful insights into 
these questions and more. In so doing, this Article differs from prior studies 
of the doctrine in three important ways.  
First, earlier empirical studies examined factors leading to the doctrine’s 
decline.40 While this study investigates that decline, it also investigates 
allegations of juries parsing patent claims “based on emotion rather than 
reason,”41 as well as a wealth of causal factors normally invisible when 
studying even landmark cases in isolation. These include litigation aspects 
such as venue, outcome, industry, and procedural posture, as well as doctrinal 
aspects such as the doctrine’s scope, equitable triggers (such as copying, 
independent design, and pioneer inventions), and limits (such as prosecution 
history estoppel and the “all-elements” rule).    
 
Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2; David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An 
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 
(2008); David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade 
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The 
Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 2051 (2007); Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, supra note 2; Christopher A. 
Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal 
Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); Jay P. Kesan & 
Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the 
Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237 (2006); Kimberly A. 
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. 
L. REV. 889 (2001). 
39 Of the 110 Federal Circuit decisions, nineteen were Rule 36 decisions. See Holte & Sichelman, 
supra note 38, at 140 (indicating that Rule 36 decisions provide confidence in the 
comprehensiveness of the dataset). 
40 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1158–59 (summarizing earlier studies either attributing the decline 
to trial courts displacing juries in construing patent claims or to the Supreme Court’s Festo 
decision reducing the doctrine’s applicability); see also id. (attributing the decline to “doctrinal 
reallocation” and “doctrinal displacement.”).  
41 Peter K. Schalestock, Equity for Whom? Defining the Reach of Non-Literal Patent Infringement, 
19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 323, 347 (1996). 
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Second, this study is based on contemporary unbroken data. Past studies 
relied on cases decided between 1991 and 2008, meaning that as of 2019 they 
are between ten and twenty-eight years old.42 By starting the period of study 
from cases decided in 2009, the Article also picks up where the most 
contemporaneous study (which capped off its dataset in 2008) left off. 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent have changed the law and earlier 
studies understandably capture only a sliver of its impact over time.43 The 
Article covers ten years of district court and appeals cases. By using a large 
data set without gaps, this study can track the impact of important 
jurisprudential developments, and do so by building on the work done by 
earlier studies.44 Some of these earlier studies also omitted jury decisions, 
district court decisions, non-precedential decisions, and unreported decisions 
creating gaps in their datasets.45 Results from this Article therefore enable 
meaningful comparisons across time by isolating factors such as win rates,46 
the success of arguments related to the doctrines tests and limits,47 as well as 
variations in technology sectors and outcomes.48  
Third, the results and conclusions of this study have immediate 
application to patent law and beyond. Findings may be used to craft a standard 
jury instruction or assist in patent law reform.49 Findings should be of interest 
to the patent system more generally. Moreover, the implications of the study 
go beyond patent law in at least three ways: first, the doctrine has roots in 
contract law and so may help analysis of contractual terms;50 second, if it turns 
out that juries are incapable of properly applying the doctrine, current practice 
 
42 See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1182..  
43 See id. at 1188 (“Changes to one doctrine may cause substantive effects on the law in other 
doctrines.”). 
44 See Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1378.  
45 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 976 (published opinions were a representative subset of all 
opinions). See id. at 963–64 (omitting jury decisions to focus on written decisions “to parse the 
grounds for decisions and the reasoning of the opinions.”); Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra 
note 2, at 1378. See also Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1183 (focusing only on Federal Circuit cases); 
see also id. at 1186 (“[N]on-precedential opinions typically are not as well organized . . . 
present[ing] potential coding difficulties.”).   
46 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 966 (“By far the most dramatic finding of our study is 
that patentees rarely win doctrine of equivalents cases,” where the study reported that patentees 
won only 24% of decided cases over the eight-year period studied.).   
47 Id. at 974–75. 
48 Id. at 972–73 (noting that while mechanical devices made up 61.7% of the cases, 
pharmaceuticals only made up 6.5% of the cases). See also id. (finding no win-rate variation 
between industries).  
49 Michel, supra note 23, at 128 (noting the lack of clear “instruction or advice [that] courts give 
to lay juries when determining whether equivalence occurs[.]”).  
50 See Reavill, supra note 11, at 347 (“[M]any commentators point to the law of contracts as a 
basis for the pure equity nature of the doctrine.”).  
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may violate patentees’ Fifth Amendment’s rights to due process;51 third, the 
doctrine’s goals in tension with each other—protecting patentees from fraud 
on their patents and protecting accused infringers from unfair trials and 
liability without adequate notice of the law undergirds property law and may 
help inform debates there;52 fourth, the results inform reconceptualizing the 
doctrine. For instance, the doctrine, while promoting fairness to the patentee, 
is not meant to be an equitable doctrine in the sense understood by lawyers.53 
However, that seems to be the way that juries have understood and applied 
it.54   
Part I of the Article traces the doctrine’s origins and delves into the heart 
of its policy tensions. It begins in 1853 when the doctrine emerged from the 
sheaves of a Supreme Court decision, and then traces the doctrine’s evolution 
through the twentieth and twenty-first century to its modern incarnation. It sets 
out the reasons for the doctrine’s incoherence and reveals that deep distrust by 
judges of juries. Commentators generally agree the judiciary have displaced 
the jury in employing the doctrine, but there is less consensus when it took 
place and how.   
Part II presents the first empirical study ever done on how courts treat 
“equitable triggers” of the doctrine such as copying, the pioneer nature of the 
invention, as well as independent invention and attempts to design around the 
patented claims. It reveals that most cases between 2009 – 2018 neither 
mentioned equity in any form, nor did equity have any discernable effect on 
case outcomes. These suggest that the doctrine’s “equitable” roots, while 
seared into conventional wisdom, has surprisingly little relevance in practice. 
To the extent equitable considerations exist, they manifested most strongly 
when parties were rivals and when the case involved allegations of copying. 
Similarly, defendants who were not rivals of the patentees-in-suit were more 
likely to prevail than if the parties were rivals in cases involving claims of 
design-arounds and independent invention. There was only one case that 
discussed pioneer inventions and no meaningful conclusion can be drawn 
there except that those cases are exceedingly rare.   
Part III investigates the doctrine’s well-known limits: the prior art bar, 
the “all-elements” rule, the public dedication rule, and the most controversial 
one of them all—prosecution history estoppel. It confirms conventional 
wisdom that patentees generally do worse than defendants, though patentee 
wins rallied in recent years under the prosecution history estoppel and the 
 
51 Id. at 363 (“Allowing jurors to decide issues that lie beyond their full understanding thus 
violates due process under the Fifth Amendment.”). 
52 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 48 (2009) (“In property law, constructive possession akin to the doctrine of equivalents 
is often justified on the basis of fairness.”).  
53 See infra Part II.  
54 See infra Section I.C. 
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public dedication rule. Additionally, the data revealed that patentees 
performed the best under the prior art bar, followed by the public dedication 
rule, prosecution history estoppel, and performed worst under the “all-
elements” rule. Part IV concludes.  
This Article has five associated Annexes devoted to comprehensively 
setting out the quantitative aspect of the study to aid future research on this 
important issue. Annex A presents this empirical study design and 
methodology. Annex B provides a table of figures. Annex C and D provide 
hyperlinks to the coding key and dataset respectively. All Annexes can be 
obtained from the author upon request. 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
Patentees can exclude others from making, using, or selling their 
inventions according to the scope of their patent claims.55 It has become as 
much an aphorism in patent law as elections are to democracy. As Judge Giles 
Rich, whose name is synonymous with U.S. patent law, observed “[t]he name 
of the game is the claim.”56 Ironically, early patent legislation did not require 
claims and infringement focused entirely instead on the “essence” of the 
patented device through an inquiry into equivalence.57   
The requirement for claims appeared only in 1836 when Congress 
removed from courts the task of “ascertaining the exact invention of the 
patentee by inference and conjecture.”58 From that point on, patents included 
claims that had to “particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, 
or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.”59  
 
55 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010). See also 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall 
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the [applicant] regards as [his] invention.”). 
56 Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American 
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990); see also John 
Witherspoon, Giles Sutherland Rich: The Patent Legacy that Started with a Failed Eye Exam, 
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/27/giles-sutherland-rich-
patent-legacy/id=77628/.  
57 See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109–12 (repealed 1793); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 
§ 10, 1 Stat. 318–23 (repealed 1836). See also Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of 
Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part I (1790-1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 
371, 385–86 (2005) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Part I] (“For the first two decades after the 1836 Patent 
Act, the Supreme Court did not definitively resolve whether the various forms of claim language 
employed after Evans might result in a disclaimer of patentable subject matter disclosed in the 
specification. During this period, “the whole patent document, including the claims as a guide, 
was to be viewed to ascertain the scope and nature of the invention and to determine whether the 
invention was embodied in the defendant's practices or devices.”).  
58 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836); Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 
U.S. 274, 278 (1877). 
59 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 119 (repealed 1870).  
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Claims at that time continued to focus on the invention’s “essence,” 
requiring courts to employ an equivalents-based approach to infringement.60 
The Supreme Court determined patent scope by reference to the “specification 
of claim” and not by reference to the disclosed invention in the specification.61 
This meant that juries had to discern “principles of the invention from the 
patent document’s textual description and schematic representations.”62 The 
claims, not the specification, determine the invention’s scope. Under this 
“central claiming” approach, patentees disclose the central features of their 
inventions and how they differ from the prior art.63 Courts determined the 
scope of the patent claim by “looking at the prior art that cabins the invention, 
how important the patentee's invention was, and how different the accused 
device is.”64 The task often led jurors to “find no infringement because they 
see [so] many superficial differences between the defendant’s machine and 
the description of the patented invention[.]”65 For this reason, the doctrine of 
equivalents exists so patentees can expand the scope of their claim to cover 
accused products differing only in minor ways. Importantly, however, courts 
did not extend patent scope beyond the construed scope of the patent claims 
until 1950.66  
By 1870, new patent legislation introduced “peripheral claims” defining 
the outer limits of the invention rather than the essence of the patent’s 
coverage.67 Claims provided jurors guidance and called “attention to what the 
inventor considered the salient features of his invention.”68 Infringement now 
focused on the literal language of the claims, with equivalents invoked only 
“when the equities of a particular case required an equivalency test.”69 With 
claims becoming central to the infringement analysis, courts developed a two-
 
60 See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 344 (1853). See also Ronald D. Hantman, Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 511, 516–17 (1988). 
61 See Winans, 56 U.S. at 338–39.  
62 Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1962.  
63 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746 (2009). 
64 Id.  
65 John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 309 (2002). 
66 Joshua D. Sarnoff, Conference Presenter at the IPIL National Conference: Has There Been 
Patent Law Progress in the Progress of Patent Law? (June 3, 2017). 
67 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952). See Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 
126 U.S. 1, 539 (1888).  (“[A] patent . . . is not to be confined to the mere means [the patentee] 
improvised to prove the reality of his conception.”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern 
Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future: Part II (1870-1952), 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 441, 454 (2005) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Part II] (“As a result of the Court's 
more permissive approach to functional claiming for pioneering processes, a patentee could patent 
all subsequent embodiments of a broadly claimed process even though the specification disclosed 
only a single embodiment.”).  
68 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
69 Reavill, supra note 11, at 330. 
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part process: (1) interpret the claims and look for literal infringement; and (2) 
expand patent rights when required by the principle of the invention.70 
A. Origins & Scope 
The Supreme Court formally recognized the doctrine of equivalents in 
1853 when it held that patent scope should “allow inventors to retain to their 
own use what they themselves have created.”71 The doctrine may have been 
rooted in Lockean theory—inventors should be justly rewarded for their labor, 
a remedy for rivals unjustly enriching themselves from a patented invention 
but does nothing to advance technology, or a safety net against Patent Office 
errors improperly limiting patent scope.72 From its birth, however, the doctrine 
was met with fierce opposition. Four dissenters in the Court cited the Patent 
Act’s requirement to “specify and point out” their claimed invention.73 
Anything less would be “mischievous” and “productive of oppressive and 
costly litigation, of exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious 
demands.”74    
In 1950, the Court shifted its focus from exclusive rights over the 
inventive concept patentees were entitled to concern over defendants’ 
behavior.75 Instead of the rationale where patentees are entitled to their 
 
70 See, e.g., Winans, 56 U.S. at 343  (“The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured if 
the public is at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions. And, 
therefore, the patentee, having described his invention, and shown its principles, and claimed it in 
that form which most perfectly embodies it, is, in contemplation of law, deemed to claim every 
form in which his invention may be copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim some of 
those forms.”).  
71 Id. at 344 (finding infringement where the accused equivalent substantially embodied the 
patentee's mode of operation to achieve “the same kind of result” as the patented invention); 
Sarnoff, Part I, supra note 57, at 375 (“In 1853, to assure a fair scope of protection, the Court in 
Winans v. Denmead adopted a liberal construction of a claim's language so that the claim would 
apply to an equivalent technology that was known to be a substitute for the invention described 
in the patent specification. The application of patents to substituted technologies later became 
known as the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’ However, a doctrine of equivalents has existed since the 
beginning of American patent law, originating as a necessary comparison of the allegedly 
infringing product or process to the patented invention before formal claim language was required. 
For over a century after Evans, the Supreme Court was careful to limit this historic doctrine of 
equivalents to the direct application of construed claim language.”). See also McCormick v. 
Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 405 (1857) (first using the phrase “doctrine of equivalents”). 
72 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 2, at 201 (noting but not endorsing the view that the doctrine of 
equivalents “is justified on the grounds that it better reflects the intellectual contribution of the 
inventor”); Nelson v. Batson, 322 F.2d 132, 135 (9th Cir. 1963) (a more contemporary 
manifestation of Lockean theory, noting “the degree of protection afforded beyond the language 
of the claims will vary directly with the value of the inventor's contribution to the art.”).   
73 Winans, 56 U.S. at 347. 
74 Id. 
75 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 605. However it is worth noting that cases involving 
pioneering inventions that influenced the Court’s decision took place earlier. For a discussion, see 
Sarnoff, Part II, supra note 67, at 452 (“From 1870 until 1950, the Court consistently held that 
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creations, it justified the doctrine as an equitable safeguard against “piracy,” 
“stealing,” and “fraud.”76 The Court recognized that “[o]utright and forthright 
duplication is a . . . very rare type of infringement,” but was nonetheless 
concerned that rivals could make “unimportant and insubstantial changes” to 
the literal claims of a patent, rendering patents “hollow and useless.”77 It 
instructed that “[t]o temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from 
stealing the benefit of an invention,” patentees may invoke the doctrine “if it 
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to 
obtain the same result.”78  
Once again, a new generation of Supreme Court judges expressed 
discomfort with the doctrine. Writing for himself and Justice Douglas, Justice 
Black reiterated Justice Campbell’s earlier concern for requiring patentees to 
“particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or 
combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.”79 He also 
criticized the majority in the present case for its “emasculation” of express 
claim wording, pointing to amendments and reissue patents as the proper 
alternative.80 According to Justice Black, the doctrine became end-run around 
a “program for alleviation of such hardships which Congress itself has 
provided.”81   
With the Federal Circuit’s emergence in 1982, the doctrine’s 
controversies migrated to that court. Congress created the Federal Circuit 
partially to resolve circuit splits of this sort in district courts and the circuit 
courts of appeals.82 However, the same ideological divide soon infected 
Federal Circuit judges as it did their Supreme Court brethren.83 The Federal 
Circuit, in two en banc decisions in 1985 and 1987 failed to provide a 
 
patent protection - including the doctrine of equivalents - was limited to the scope of application 
of construed claim language (although that scope had been dramatically expanded for pioneering 
patents).”). Sarnoff, Part I, supra note 57, at 375, 376 (“The modern doctrine of equivalents thus 
extends patent protection beyond the scope of physical embodiments (i.e., applications, whether 
or not enumerated in the specification) of a claim's language. It extends the exclusionary patent 
law infringement right (and contributory liability) to additional products or processes that are 
considered to be factually equivalent to those embodiments.”).   
76 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 607–08.  
77 Id. at 607 (stating the reason for the doctrine of equivalents is to protect patent holders from an 
“unscrupulous copyist”); see also id. at 608 (“The essence of the doctrine is that one may not 
practice a fraud on a patent.”). 
78 Id. at 608 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
79 Id. at 613.  
80 Id. at 614–15 (Black, J., dissenting).  
81 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 614–15 (Black, J., dissenting).   
82 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, §127, 96 Stat. 25, 37–38 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1295); see S. Rep. No. 97–275, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (noting that the Federal Circuit would “increase doctrinal stability in the 
field of patent law”). 
83 Blaine Larson, Comment, How Tangential Does It Have to Be?: Making Sense of Festo’s 
Tangential Limitations Doctrine, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 959, 968 (2011) (summarizing case law).  
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definitive approach to applying the doctrine.84 Similar to the current quandary 
with patent eligible subject matter, practitioners were left unable to predict 
how a court might treat precedent in any given case.85 It was up to the Supreme 
Court to weigh in once again.  
In 1997 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this “significant 
disagreement” between how to balance between public notice and fairness to 
patentees.86 It determined that the doctrine was administrable despite its 
imprecision if courts remained vigilant to its underlying policies and guard 
against patentees seeking to “eliminate completely” the technological 
substance behind claim limitations. In doing so, it set out two limitations to 
the doctrine: the “all-elements” rule and prosecution history estoppel.87 
The “all-elements” rule requires patentees to show that the accused 
device contains elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of 
the patented invention.88 This rule prevents patentees from using the doctrine 
to broaden a claim element to vitiate the other claim elements, so claim 
limitations cannot be construed in ways that render them meaningless.89 If an 
accused device does not contain at least an equivalent for each limitation of 
the claim, there is no infringement because a required part of the claimed 
invention is missing. As with the doctrine, courts have “no set formula for 
 
84 See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); 
Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 931, cert. denied 485 U.S. 961 (1988). 
85 See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019) (producing eight separate opinions in a denial for rehearing en banc); see also Douglas 
A. Strawbridge, Daniel W. McDonald & R. Carl Moy, Patent Law Developments in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 861, 887–88 
(1987). 
86 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 21 (noting its goal was to “to clarify the proper scope” of 
the doctrine); see also Sarnoff, supra note 57, at 376–77 (noting that the Court “extended 
equivalents protection to later-arising equivalent technologies, and imperfectly reconciled the 
modern doctrine with the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel for amended claims.”). See also 
id. (describing how the Court “departed from its historic standards for strictly construing 
statements and amendments made by the applicant during prosecution and for determining 
whether they resulted in implied disclaimers of patentable subject matter.”).  
87 See id. at 17; see also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1979.  
88 Id. at 29. (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope 
of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual 
elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”). Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1979 
n.161 (“Suppose a patent claims a process comprising step 1, followed by step 2, followed by step 
3. Suppose an alleged infringer gets the process to work using step 1 followed by step 3 with step 
2 omitted. Then there is no literal infringement because step 2 is omitted. Similarly, the all-
elements rule of Pennwalt precludes application of the DOE because step 2 is omitted. Under the 
old rule, a finding of infringement under the DOE was possible when courts looked at the 
invention as a whole.”).  
89 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (“Vitiation” is not an exception to the doctrine of 
equivalents, but instead a legal determination that “the evidence is such that no reasonable jury 
could determine two elements to be equivalent[.]”).  
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determining whether a finding of equivalence would vitiate a claim limitation, 
and thereby violate the all [elements] rule.”90  
The “all-elements rule” was a refinement to determining patent 
infringement by the looking at the patented invention’s “essence.” The Federal 
Circuit initially determined infringement by looking at the claimed invention 
holistically.91 It later cabined this approach because it gave insufficient weight 
to claim limitations and too much leeway to juries, a theme that would run 
through the doctrine’s history to the present day.92 Ostensibly, the rule 
encourages patentees to craft their claims carefully, and discourages “abstract, 
holistic arguments in favor of equivalency.”93 Judges would employ the “all-
elements” rule where applicants could have easily written claims to literally 
cover the defendant’s product and did not.94 Courts also compare the accused 
device with the patent claim not simply the two devices.95 
The Court’s second limitation to the doctrine, prosecution history 
estoppel, teaches that “any surrender of subject matter during patent 
prosecution, regardless of the reason for such surrender, precludes recapturing 
any part of that subject matter, even if it is equivalent to the matter expressly 
claimed.”96 Prosecution history is the public record of the correspondence 
between patent applicants and examiners during the prosecution process.97 
Just as legislative history aids statutory interpretation, prosecution history 
illuminates the breadth of claims.98 Patentees who disclaim embodiments 
during the prosecution process cannot recover those embodiments at trial 
 
90 Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
91 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364. (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
92 See Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 935 (“[E]ach limitation must be viewed in the context of the 
entire claim [.]”). See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1979. 
93 Lee Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 929 (2010) 
[hereinafter Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law].  
94 Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Thus, for a patentee who 
has claimed an invention narrowly, there may not be infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents in many cases, even though the patentee might have been able to claim more broadly. 
If it were otherwise, then claims would be reduced to functional abstracts, devoid of meaningful 
structural limitations on which the public could rely.”).  
95 See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 29 (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents must be applied to 
individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 
970 F.2d 816, 822, n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[C]laim limitations drawn to a pen would not under the 
doctrine of equivalents cover a pencil and vice versa.”) (emphasis in original). 
96 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 30. See also Sarnoff, Part I, supra note 57, at 377 (“[T]he 
Court departed from its historic standards for strictly construing statements and amendments made 
by the applicant during prosecution and for determining whether they resulted in implied 
disclaimers of patentable subject matter.”).  
97 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  
98 See id. (comparing prosecution history to legislative history); 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2005) 
(prosecution history becomes public post-issuance.). 
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through the doctrine.99 The estoppel usually arises when applicants narrow 
claims in response to objections that the original wording is not enabled or is 
unpatentable in view of the prior art.100  
As the Court explained, prosecution history estoppel is linked both to 
“the role of claims in defining an invention and providing public notice, and 
to the primacy of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in ensuring that 
the claims allowed cover only subject matter that is properly patentable in a 
proffered patent application.”101 Conventional wisdom teaches that the 
doctrine of equivalents is mostly used to correct errors made by applicants.102 
In this way, the prominence of prosecution history estoppel seems apt. 
However, the Court left two major issues unanswered. First, what types of 
claim amendments give rise to prosecution history estoppel? And second, does 
prosecution history estoppel completely bar the doctrine or simply limit the 
range of its application?  
These issues divided the lower courts in what commentators described 
as a “tumultuous” period.103 Some judges allowed a “flexible bar,” favoring 
broader protection for patent holders, while others preferred a strict rule 
favoring clear notice to the public and treating a narrowing amendment of as 
a complete surrender of subject matter.104 The Federal Circuit attempted to 
resolve the issue en banc, holding that prosecution history estoppel arises from 
any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act, not only 
from amendments made to avoid the prior art.105 It rejected the Supreme 
Court’s approach as “unworkable,” and brazenly declared that “prosecution 
history estoppel acts as a complete bar to the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents when an amendment has narrowed the scope of a claim[.]”106 The 
Federal Circuit declared that when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of 
equivalence for the element that was amended.107 Its approach, however, only 
served to stoke the divisions further, resulting in many calling for the Supreme 
Court to resolve the controversy.108   
 
99 See Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942); Conigliaro, Greenberg & 
Lemley, supra note 2, at 1064–65 (explaining how it is “based on the equitable concept of an 
implied promise”). 
100 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled on other 
grounds (en banc) (illustrating how a narrowing argument leads to estoppel). 
101 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 33–34.  
102 Adelman & Francione, supra note 2, at 716. 
103 See Chisum, supra note 9, at 14 (describing the state of the law at the time as “tumultuous”); 
see also Davé, supra note 36, at 511. 
104 See Larson, supra note 83, at 967 (summarizing relevant case law). 
105 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(en banc).   
106 Id. at 574.  
107 Id. 
108 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 960. 
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Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court turned to focus on the doctrine 
once more in 2002.109 In what commentators have dubbed “the most important 
Supreme Court patent case since Congress created the Federal Circuit,” the 
Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit.110 The Supreme Court 
chastised the Federal Circuit for “ignor[ing] [its] guidance” and disrupting 
“the settled expectations of the inventing community.”111 While 
acknowledging the importance of certainty, the Court recognized that 
literalism would “greatly diminish” the value of patents, and opted for a 
“flexible” approach to allow patentees to overcome the presumption that 
prosecution history estoppel applied.112 The Court justified its preference for 
favoring patentees because it was impossible to draft claims that perfectly 
covered their intended scope and diminish patent value.113 This was, the Court 
wrote, “the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation[.]”114 
As a general rule, the Court held that narrowing amendments “may be 
presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim 
and the amended claim.”115 However, patentees may rebut that presumption 
by showing “at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not 
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally 
encompassed the alleged equivalent.”116 This occurs when: (1) the equivalent 
was “unforeseeable at the time of the application”; (2) the rationale behind the 
amendment bore “no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in 
question”; or (3) there was “some other reason” a patent applicant could not 
have been expected to describe “the insubstantial substitute in question.”117 
An equivalent is foreseeable if a skilled artisan would know an 
alternative existed and the patentee should have claimed it.118 Since the 
patentee did not claim the alternative, it cannot later use the doctrine to capture 
that variation.119 Commentators observed that “by electing to emphasize the 
 
109 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 722.  
110 Id. at 742; Larson, supra note 83, at 971; see also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1981 (called 
Festo “one of the most significant patent law cases in recent history.”). 
111 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 739. 
112 Id. at 738 (“We have considered what equivalents were surrendered during the prosecution of 
the patent, rather than imposing a complete bar that resorts to the very literalism the equivalents 
rule is designed to overcome.”).  
113 Id. at 731 (“The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention 
or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty.”). 
114 Id. at 732. 
115 Id. at 740. 
116 Id. at 741. 
117 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740–41. 
118 See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
119 See Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1425 (a  “subsequent change in the state of the art, such as later-
developed technology, obfuscated the significance of [the] limitation at the time of its 
incorporation into the claim.”).  
2020] JUDGING EQUIVALENTS  241 
policy of public notice, courts have challenged the legitimacy of the premise 
that the doctrine of equivalents is necessary to protect the incentive structure 
of the patent system.”120 Courts themselves have recognized that benefiting 
patentees through non-textual infringement comes at the expense of clarity 
and notice to the public.121  
The second way patentees can rebut the prosecution history is to show 
that the amendment bears little to no relationship to the asserted equivalent. 
Here, commentators say the inquiry “focus[es] on the intent of the applicant 
in making the relevant amendment.”122 The patentee could not have 
voluntarily surrendered the equivalent if subject matter related to a different 
aspect of the invention.123  
The Federal Circuit articulated three principles on tangentiality: (1) 
“peripheral . . . to the alleged equivalent,”124 (2) “discernable from the 
prosecution history,”125 (3) whatever they surrender to obtain a patent, even if 
the final scope of the claims is narrower than necessary to avoid prior art.126 
There remains “still no consistent definition for when a narrowing amendment 
is tangential.”127 The third and final way patentees can rebut prosecution 
history estoppel is to show that there is “some other reason” for the narrowing 
amendment.128  
To this day, the Supreme Court has not spoken on the doctrine of 
equivalents. However, the doctrine has not remained dormant. The Federal 
Circuit and district courts continue to struggle with its ad hoc and amorphous 
boundaries. For instance, in 2019 the Federal Circuit attempted to cabin the 
doctrine to “exceptional cases” to prevent it from becoming “simply the 
second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend 
protection beyond the scope of the claims.”129 In a recent blog post response, 
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Professor Dennis Crouch pushed back, criticizing the Federal Circuit’s 
limitation as “a major step without precedential backing.”130  
According to Professors Michael Meurer and Craig Nard, “[t]o the extent 
that a modern justification for the doctrine can be inferred, it apparently starts 
with the belief that the patent system generally works to give inventors patent 
claims with the proper breadth, but sometimes frictions in the system cause 
patent claims to be too narrow.131 They explain that courts use the doctrine as 
an “efficient response to frictions present in the claims drafting process . . . to 
restore proper patent scope and provide the appropriate incentive to create and 
disclose inventions.”132 They identify three sources of “friction”: (1) mistakes 
committed when drafting and prosecuting a patent,133 (2) limitations of 
language,134 and (3) the difficulty in foreseeing technical developments 
relevant to the patented technology.135 
The corollary to a malleable standard is that determining the scope of 
equivalents becomes a fact-intensive endeavor. Minor, inconsequential 
changes enable rivals avoiding literal infringement and allowing them to avoid 
infringement in this manner diminishes the value of patents and harms 
innovation incentives.136 The other policy encourages rivals to innovate with 
clear notice of what patents embrace so they can read and design around 
them.137 A skilled person in the art reading claims should understand the scope 
of the patent and avoid infringement.138 
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In sum, the doctrine remains unruly and challenging  to properly 
administer. To many, the doctrine of equivalents “lacks a coherent vision” and 
is the most controversial doctrine in patent law,139 with some observing that 
“[t]he patent community continues to struggle to develop an analysis that is 
both equitable and predictable.”140 Why has it been so difficult to articulate a 
coherent doctrine? What have courts done to bridle this unruly doctrine? And 
does the doctrine even matter today? This Article offers empirical evidence 
from which to understand the doctrine’s past and to chart its future. These are 
the issues which the next parts will explore. 
B. Incoherence 
Anyone who makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells a patented invention, 
within the United States, or imports into the United States a patented invention 
during the term of the patent without the patentee’s permission is guilty of 
patent infringement.141 To determine infringement, courts may look at the 
substantial identity of the accused product or process to the claimed 
invention.142 This measures the degree to which the alleged infringer 
appropriated the patentee’s inventive concept.143  
In 1950, the Supreme Court underscored that its “function-way-result” 
test was not a “prisoner of a formula.”144 In 1997, it endorsed the “insubstantial 
differences” test as a possible alternative but declined to choose one.145 Lower 
courts continued to determine equivalence in an ad hoc fashion, with no 
guidance from the Federal Circuit.146 Describing the “insubstantial differences 
test” as “elusive and frustrating,” commentators note that “the Federal Circuit 
has not, and probably will never, set out a definitive formula for determining 
whether an element of an accused device is a “substantial equivalent” of a 
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claim limitation pertaining to a claim element.”147 Whether under the 
“function-way-result” test or the “insubstantial differences” test, there are 
several reasons fueling the perennial struggle for clarity.  
First, courts must decipher the substance and nature of the invention. The 
“function-way-result test” demands a single result and a single function. 
Sometimes each invention may produce many results and have many 
functions. At other times, “function” and “result” may be essentially the same 
thing,148 and “[b]ecause the accused infringers are often competitors of the 
patentees, the accused device and the patented device normally have the same 
function and result, and thus the determination normally turns on the “way” 
component.”149  
One Federal Circuit case illustrates the arbitrariness in which courts can 
interpret “way” despite clear and narrow claim language.150 The court found 
equivalence even though an element of the claim was missing in the accused 
device and where another performed in the opposite direction in the accused 
device.151 The opinion suggests that meeting the “function” and “result” 
prongs satisfies the “way” prong too.152 Moreover, the “function-way-result” 
test may result in a broader range than the “insubstantial differences” test. 
Ibuprofen could infringe a claim for aspirin despite their distinct chemical 
structures, because the drugs performed the same function in the same way to 
give the same results.153  
Similarly, the particularized analysis of the “all-elements” rule was 
meant to better serve the notice function.154 In practice, courts have difficulty 
matching language and meaning. While the “all-elements” rule constrains the 
doctrine by requiring a mapping of elements, it does not prevent uncertainty 
springing from how courts choose to define the elements of a claim.155  
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According to Former Chief Judge Michel, it is unclear to the Federal Circuit 
when an equivalence “vitiates” or “effectively eliminates” a claim 
limitation.156 Some cases focus on the combination as a whole,157 while others 
indicate that an equivalent of every claim limitation must be found in the 
accused device.158 The distinction seems to depend on whether the patent 
covers a “pioneer invention.”159 If so, the claims enjoy broad protection, which 
commentators attribute to the lack of relevant prior art rather than an expansive 
interpretation of the claims themselves.160 The rule thus preserves the narrow 
scope of patents in a crowded field, and in so doing, complements the 
doctrine’s favoring of pioneer inventors.161  
Second, the “function-way-result” test merely gives the purpose and goal 
of claim elements, but does not define the invention. The “way” an element 
operates only supplies “the means or mechanism by which it operates, but does 
not reliably tell what the invention is”162 because this “is what structural terms 
in the claims are for.”163 Additionally, while claims may also use “means plus 
function” language, which does not explicitly define structure in the claim 
itself, structure is implicitly defined because interpretation of such “means 
plus function” language is “construed to cover the corresponding structure, 
material, or acts defined in the specification and equivalents thereof.”164  
In both these aspects, the “insubstantial differences test” does not fare 
well either. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that “the insubstantial 
differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might render any 
given difference ‘insubstantial.’ ”165 While the Court saw “no purpose in going 
further and micromanaging the Federal Circuit's particular word choice for 
analyzing equivalence,” it reiterated the application of its “function-way-
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result” test and left it to the Federal Circuit to “refine the formulation of the 
test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations.”166  
Third, courts must also conceptualize and compare each claimed element 
and has nearly unfettered discretion in deciding how broadly or narrowly to 
define each operative term.167 As Section II.C discusses, this discretion raises 
the concern that incompetent and biased juries would reach erroneous and 
potentially unreviewable results. It can be a dicey business for courts to avoid 
aggregating two or more claimed elements into a single element, since the 
latter impermissibly treats the “invention as a whole.”168  
Construing construction is inherently ambiguous. Words cannot be 
mapped nearly to inventions.169 Commentators noted that “courts define the 
scope of legal rights not by reference to the invention but by reference to 
semantic debates over the meaning of words chosen by lawyers.”170 
Despite being based on factual evidence such as the patent’s prosecution 
history and expert testimony, what the claims mean to a person of ordinary 
skill in the art is a legal question. Once properly construed, applying the claims 
to the accused device is a factual question: does the accused device fall within 
the scope of the properly interpreted claim, either literally or under the 
doctrine of equivalents? Infringement is a question of fact and jury verdicts of 
infringement must be supported by substantial evidence.171 Patentees must 
explain why a given element of the accused device is equivalent to the 
corresponding claim limitation.172 Mere assertions will not suffice, and 
conventional wisdom teaches that courts will “hastily” rule against patentees 
in summary judgment motions if they fail to produce evidence establishing 
equivalence.173 They need to isolate the proof for each element of the claim 
and show juries “substantial identity” as to each of the function, way, and 
result prongs of the doctrine.174 This takes the form of particularized testimony 
and linked arguments to prevent the jury from being “put to sea without 
guiding charts.”175 It also guards against juries determining infringement by 
comparing the claimed invention and the accused device using an “overall 
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similarity” approach.176 Skepticism over the jury’s competence has marked 
the doctrine’s history and would come to play a formative role in shaping its 
present incarnation.  
C. Incompetence 
From the moment the doctrine was born, the judges who watched its 
birth were concerned that the doctrine would substitute the judgement of the 
Patent Office with the court’s view on the breadth of patent rights.177 That 
concern continues to the present day with courts and commentators worrying 
that the uncertainty and risk of false positives caused by the unruly doctrine 
would be exacerbated by having juries apply it.178 Federal Circuit Judge Plager 
even mooted declaring the doctrine of equivalents “a judge-made rule in the 
first place—to have its roots firmly in equity, and to acknowledge that when 
and in what circumstances it applies is a question of equitable law, a question 
for which judges bear responsibility.”179  
Part of the concern is one of competence. To determine patent 
infringement, courts construe claims as a matter of law and juries then 
compare the construed claims to the accused device.180 Juries must decide, as 
a matter of fact, whether the accused device infringes the claims, either 
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.181 The problem is that jurors 
“frequently” have difficulty understanding legal jargon in complex 
litigation,182 “and [are] easily misled by expert testimony”183 dealing with 
“technologies at the forefront of innovation . . . where issues may hinge upon 
legal and scientific concepts that even experts can have difficulty 
understanding.”184 Biotechnology is an area where the doctrine may be 
particularly difficult to apply. This is because of the  
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complex panoply of nucleotide sequences, proteins, antibodies, 
engineered cell lines, vaccines, and viruses that constitute the current 
array of biologic pharmaceuticals, a class of therapies that will almost 
certainly become more numerous and complex in the future. The 
analysis is further complicated by the fact that simple changes, even 
single changes at the DNA or protein level, can lead to drastic 
consequences for the biologic in question.185 
No less than three Federal Circuit judges argued that determining equivalence 
by jury is “operationally unsatisfactory and jurisprudentially unjustified.”186  
In 1996 the Supreme Court held that judges could be entrusted to “give 
a proper interpretation to such instruments patents than a jury; and he is, 
therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can 
be expected to be.”187 Borrowing contract law as an analogy, a patent is a 
contract between the patentee and government.188 Courts reform claims the 
same way they would reform contractual terms when literal analysis fails to 
produce a “fair” result.189 Further, because the doctrine involves issues of both 
law and fact, a case may be made for judges to decide the legal issue alone.190 
This “logic,” commentators say, “readily carries over to equivalency 
analysis,”191 because juries lack “the necessary technical or legal 
sophistication to make the fine-line determinations required by a doctrine of 
equivalents analysis.”192 Incompetence in the face of complexity leads to the 
second problem—bias.  
Substitution bias is a well-known behavioral quirk which manifests 
when people need to decide a complex issue and subconsciously substitutes a 
more easily heuristic.193 Commentators raised the specter of juries favoring 
patentees due to their high regard for the PTO and the patent system in general, 
even though they understand little about the actual workings of either.194 Juries 
asked to determine infringement as a matter of patent law may instead decide 
which side they think is the “good guy.”195 In this regard, conventional 
wisdom tells us jury bias favors patentees and may cause them to substitute 
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substantiality for the notion that of the two devices, the patentee’s is better. 
Juries tend to view the U.S. PTO and its scrutiny of patent applications with 
high regard despite evidence indicating otherwise.196 The perception is that 
the government has “at least validated that invention and honored the patentee 
for her contribution to technological progress.”197   
Juries also “tend to idealize inventors” as individuals with the “talent, 
skills, and effort to invent something [that] has received the recognition of the 
United States of America.”198 They may therefore rely on patentees’ 
investments to determine the “worthiness” of their cause or conversely, the 
lack of alleged infringer’s investments in determining the “unworthiness” of 
their defense against infringement.199 This notion is encouraged by the 
Supreme Court’s suggestion, that absence of the alleged infringer’s research 
investment gives rise to an inference of “practicing ‘a fraud on a patent.’ ”200 
Juries instead may view infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
as whether the defendant was “wrong” in infringing the patent and should be 
punished for “stealing” the patentee’s invention.201 Indeed, courts expressly 
recognized evidence of copying as relevant evidence even though a technical, 
rational reading of patent claims and prosecution history should strictly 
speaking be the only determinants.202 The alleged infringer’s copying may 
also be a proxy of its lack of investment. Conversely, where there is evidence 
that the alleged infringer sought to design around the patented invention, the 
doctrine of equivalents is less appropriate. 
Infected by substitution bias, jurors “focus on the actions of the people 
involved in a trial and not on specific exhibits (like models of the invention 
and the accused device) or documents (like a claim chart).”203 This extraneous 
evidence prevents juries from “mak[ing] the objective determination required 
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in a doctrine of equivalents analysis,”204 and “improperly allowing the patent 
holder to expand the patent protection by encouraging patent holders to initiate 
(or threaten to initiate) abusive infringement lawsuits that not only cost the 
defendants time, money, and aggravation, but may also serve to artificially 
inflate license fees for patented technology.”205  
In contrast, conventional wisdom teaches that judges have a comparative 
advantage because “[f]ederal judges typically have decades of legal 
experience before being appointed to the bench and are sensitive to the 
meaning of legal words and phrases.”206 As the Federal Circuit itself noted, 
“[u]nlike a jury in a district court case, the [International Trade] Commission 
resolves disputes involving patent infringement matters with some regularity 
and thus is aware of doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence.”207 Moreover, 
“patent cases are concentrated in a relatively small number of districts, and 
judges–unlike jurors–are often ‘repeat players’ in patent litigation.”208  
Proponents of using juries regard their disparagement as “arrogant and 
paternalistic.”209 Some have said “performing a function/way/result analysis 
involves the same level of juror competence and discretion as gauging 
ordinary negligence.”210 But if true, placing equivalents in the hands of jurors 
incompetent to decide those issues may violate due process under the Fifth 
Amendment.211 
The other part of the problem stems from the legal system itself. Juries 
must answer the question of patent infringement in a binary fashion—simply 
a “yes” or “no”—with no opportunity to offer the basis for their 
conclusions.212 On appeal, jury verdicts provide no meaningful way for the 
Federal Circuit to assess whether “the jury understood the technology, 
understood the law of patents and the policies that underlie it, understood the 
function, way, and result of the matter, and arrived at a considered 
decision.”213 Moreover, “because the reviewing court normally has little to go 
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by except for the final determination concerning infringement, there is 
generally something somewhere in the record that the winning party can argue 
is substantial enough to uphold the jury verdict.”214  
The Federal Circuit’s ability to review the lower court’s decision is 
further limited because infringement is a question of fact, reversible for 
prejudicial error in the jury instructions or for lack of substantial evidence 
supporting the verdict.215 In most cases, jury determinations will be upheld 
“even if they did not actually understand the technology or if they performed 
the doctrine of equivalents analysis improperly.”216 In describing judicial 
frustration with the doctrine of equivalents, Judge Plager noted that “[f]ederal 
district judges, perhaps understandably, by and large make little pretense of 
liking these patent infringement cases, and are quite content to give them, and 
all the issues in them, to juries to decide. The cases typically come to us on 
appeal with nothing more than a general verdict finding infringement. There 
is no explanation by the jury of the rationale behind their verdict, if any 
exists.”217 
The Supreme Court acknowledged “unreviewability” of “black-box jury 
verdicts,” and suggested that “where the evidence is such that no reasonable 
jury could determine two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged 
to grant partial or complete summary judgments.”218 Conventional wisdom 
notes that “more and more patent litigators attempt to avoid the jury ‘black 
box’ by filing for summary judgment.”219 Previously both judge and jury had 
a role in determining the outcome of a doctrine of equivalents case as “an issue 
of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury trial with proper instructions, and 
to be decided by the judge in a bench trial.”220 However, the incoherence of 
the doctrine combined with the risk that an incompetent, inscrutable, and 
almost unreviewable jury verdict creates a rational incentive for judges to seek 
to cabin it wherever they can. For if this unruly exception to infringement 
swallowed the rule, the result could be disastrous.221 It would be up to the 
judges to prevent this result, even if they had to do so through displacing the 
jury’s function. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides that district courts may 
grant a motion for a judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) “at any time before 
the case is submitted to the jury” “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue 
during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a 
 
214 Folker, supra note 14, at 227.  
215 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.  
216 Folker, supra note 14, at 227.  
217 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1538 (Plager, J., dissenting). 
218 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. 
219 White, supra note 31, at 786. 
220 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522, supplemented, 64 F.3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  
221 See, e.g., Meurer & Nard, supra note 2. 
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legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”222 
Following an earlier study, “a court’s decision to grant JMOL before verdict 
at trial was classified as a judicial decision—because the judge determined 
there was no willfulness—even though the rest of the issues in the case may 
have been decided by a jury.”223  
This begs the question of whether equivalence findings varied depending 
on whether it was a bench or jury trial. The coding differentiated between 
bench trials and those jury trials that also involved a JMOL by the patentee or 
defendant. Figures 1 and 2 below show both types of trials strongly favor the 
defendant. They appear to mirror each other, both in terms of relative wins 
and the trends over time. The fact that there is no discernible difference 
between bench trials and jury trials shows that whatever concern there might 
have been to incompetent juries may have little factual basis. 
 
 
Figure 1: Bench Trial 
 
222 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). 
223 Seaman, supra note 182, at 445. 
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Figure 2: Bench & Jury Trial (Outcome) 
 
Conventional wisdom thus teaches that less successful patentees 
invoking the doctrine after Markman hearings became important.224 Earlier 
studies do indeed bear this finding out. The Allison-Lemley study found 
patentees had a relatively low win rate of twenty-four percent of cases 
compared to overall win rates of fifty-eight percent.225 This result tracks 
conventional wisdom that “summary judgment is now the most likely method 
of disposition for patent cases.”226 
Patentees won 33.5% of the cases involving the function-way-result test, 
and 29.5% of the cases involving the insubstantial differences test.227 Within 
those numbers, more than two-thirds of the wins simply involved defeating a 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment rather than winning on the 
merits.228 Patentees won on the merits less than ten percent of cases.229 The 
Allison-Lemley study indicates that by the late 1990s, patentees almost never 
prevailed at trial or on appeal.230  
 
224 Id. at 977–98. 
225 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 966 (“This finding is robust across each of the three 
datasets—patentees  won 27.6% of the cases before Festo, 21.7% of the cases in the mid-Festo 
period, and 22.2% post-Festo.”). 
226 White, supra note 31, at 751. 
227 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 967, 975. 
228 Id. at 967 (“While a significant victory, it is hardly the same as actually winning the case on 
equivalents grounds.”). 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 970–71. 
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D. Irrelevance 
The move to peripheral claiming has disadvantaged patentees in two 
important ways. First, peripheral claiming enabled clever defendants to 
interpret claim terms so as to render them invalid or not infringed. Professors 
Lemley and Burk noted that  
[i]f a defendant makes ten such claim-construction arguments, the 
patentee may have to win every one in order for the claim to survive. So 
the more terms a court construes, the more bites at the apple defendants 
get. And because claim drafting is, as we have seen, inherently 
imprecise, any one mistake can be fatal.231  
Second, the doctrine of equivalents is effectively a form of central claiming. 
Here, Professors Burk and Lemley explain that the doctrine “asks whether the 
accused device appropriates the ‘gist’ of the literal claims by adopting a 
substitution known in the art.”232 However, in an age of peripheral claiming, 
“[c]ourts are aware that the text of the claims is supposed to represent the 
outermost boundaries of the inventor's rights, and they are anxious not to 
expand the claims through the doctrine of equivalents.”233 As a result, this 
“leads to expansion of the patent claims under the rubric of literal 
interpretation; rather than finding infringement by equivalents, interpretive 
sleight of hand is used to stretch the claims text to cover similar accused 
devices.”234  
Earlier empirical studies indicate that courts applied it consistently until 
between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. 235 The Allison-Lemley study was less 
sanguine, reporting that “[t]he doctrine of equivalents was largely dead by 
1998.”236 The cause of its purported death was the Supreme Court’s 1996 
decision that claim interpretation, or a Markman hearing, as it would be called, 
was an issue for the judge, not the jury.237 The study premised this shift on the 
technical complexity of modern claims which judges were better suited to 
handle. Claim construction could also be determined based on records 
developed during summary judgment briefings which was again the province 
 
231 Burk & Lemley, supra note 63, at 1763.  
232 Id.  
233 Id.  
234 Id.  
235 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958 (2007); Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 
1378–79 (2010); Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 215, 233 (2008) [hereinafter Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect]. 
236 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 976–78. 
237 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390–91. See also Schwartz, supra note 2 at 1179 (“[T]he displacement 
of the doctrine of equivalents, which led to its decreasing importance, occurred after Markman I, 
well before any direct assaults on the doctrine in these cases.”).  
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for the judge, not the jury.238 Literal infringement became the rule and the 
doctrine became its exception.239  
The effect has been a substantial reduction in cases where the doctrine 
applied.240 Post-Markman, the Federal Circuit would discuss it “in the same 
breath as claim construction.”241 
The reasoning is as follows: the doctrine of equivalents and claim 
construction both determine patent scope. Claim construction demarcates its 
literal reach. The doctrine of equivalents stretches that notional limit where 
differences between the literal claim scope and the accused product are 
insubstantial. 242 Claim construction is relatively easier to use and reduces the 
unpredictability of jury trials by shifting the determination to judges. 
Moreover, once judges have ruled on claim construction, they want to resolve 
the entire dispute since judges constructing claims know the accused products’ 
structures.243 This allows them to settle on a broader construction to avoid 
having the jury contend with the doctrine.244  
Markman caused district court judges to grant summary judgment of 
non-infringement245 since judges “will be doubly inclined to hold for the 
accused infringer” to dispose of the case.246 As the Federal Circuit put it 
 
238 See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“After 
discovery the court expects the parties to refine the disputed issues and learn more about the claim 
terms and technology, at which point a more accurate claim construction can be attempted.”). 
239 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 978. 
240 Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, “Vitiating” the Doctrine of Equivalents: A New 
Patent Law Doctrine, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 457, 459 (2003) (“These other decisions, which have 
become more and more frequent in the last few years, limit the DOE by effectively creating a per 
se rule as to what constitutes an equivalent.”). In 2001, the Federal Circuit continued narrowing 
the reach of the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit en banc eliminated the doctrine of 
equivalents for a different type of claim element—no equivalents are available for subject matter 
disclosed in a patent specification but not literally claimed.  See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 
F.3d at 1046. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1203 (the Federal Circuit often discussed the doctrine of 
equivalents in robust detail). Id. at 1204 (noting that claim construction appears in less than fifty 
percent of appellate decisions pre-Markman, increasing to seventy percent of decisions by 2000 
while the doctrine declined).  
241 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1203.   
242 See e.g. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958; Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, 
at 1378–79 (2010).    
243 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958. 
244 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1181 (“[C]ourts may have found these doctrines to be substitutes 
for each other”; “claim construction has arguably expanded to encompass the doctrine of 
equivalents.”); Id. (“[J]udges quickly decided the doctrine of equivalents under the guise of 
summary judgment to keep the case from the jury.”); Id. at 1182 (“Judges who held separate 
hearings may have been more likely to learn the technology and have a greater desire to dispose 
of the case in its entirety after claim construction.”); Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958 
(“That dataset bears out our hypothesis. The doctrine of equivalents was alive and well before 
Markman but has been in decline ever since.”).  
245 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 977.  
246 Id. 
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“[w]here the parties do not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused 
product . . . but disagree over possible claim interpretations, the question of 
literal infringement collapses into claim construction and is amenable to 
summary judgment.”247      
Claim construction, however, is just one means by which judges took 
control of the doctrine. Another means of doing so is by granting summary 
judgment based on one or more of the judicial limits set on the doctrine such 
as prosecution history estoppel.248 This is because “[j]udges have wide latitude 
in almost any patent suit to foreclose the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of 
law, thus preventing juries from applying the doctrine of equivalents to find 
infringement” through tests like “function-way-result” and limits like 
prosecution history estoppel.249 
The Petherbridge study observed that “the decline of the doctrine is the 
natural evolution of judicial efforts to emphasize the policy that the public 
should have reliable notice of the scope of a patentee’s right to exclude.”250 It 
noted that “while the courts were killing the doctrine of equivalents, patent 
applicants were increasing the rate at which they filed applications for new 
inventions,” leading them to conclude “that  innovators might not need the 
encouragement of the doctrine of equivalents to innovate and disclose,”251 or 
“pushed innovators to invent and disclose more, perhaps to ensure that 
commercial innovations (which may embody many inventions) find adequate 
protection.”252 Moreover, patentees are suing on more patents, suggesting 
patents remain valuable despite its decline.253 
The Allison-Lemley study reported 413 equivalents cases between 1999 
and 2005, giving an average of 91.8 cases per year.254 The Article reports 316 
cases over ten years between 2009 and 2018, giving an average of 31.6 cases 
a year. This precipitous drop of two-thirds shows the parties are far less likely 
to assert the doctrine than they were a decade ago. Figures 3 and 4 below show 
the breakdown over each of the ten years. Other than a spike in 2010, the 
number of district court cases has remained both consistently and markedly 
lower. The graph presenting Federal Circuit cases shows that 2010 district 
 
247 General Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
248 See Paul, supra note 37, at 248 (“This discretion can operate through several mechanisms, 
including function-way-result analysis, prosecution history estoppel, and the all-elements rule. 
Judges can also foreclose the doctrine of equivalents through their application of other areas of 
patent law, such as claim construction.”).  
249 Paul, supra note 37, at 248. 
250 Petherbridge, On the Decline, supra note 2, at 1404. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at n.97. 
253 See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 
(2009) (documenting the increase in patent litigation intensity); Petherbridge, On the Decline, 
supra note 2, at 1405. 
254 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 980. 
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court spike percolating upwards starting in 2011 and 2012, before leveling off 
through 2015 and declining sharply thereafter. While lower than before, the 
doctrine remains alive and a trap for the unwary. What role do equitable 
triggers and limitations to the doctrine play in courts applying the doctrine 
today? These are discussed next in Parts II and III.  
 
 
Figure 3: District Court Cases (Over Time) 
 
Figure 4: Federal Circuit Court Cases (Over Time) 
II. EQUITABLE TRIGGERS 
Known as “equitable triggers,” evidence of copying, independent 
development, and the pioneer status of the invention, may affect how liberally 
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or narrowly courts apply the doctrine of equivalents. Courts and commentators 
agree that the doctrine seeks to ensure patentees get fair protection in their 
claims, there is less consensus on what extent “equitable” principles animate 
the doctrine.255 As a policy lever for courts to achieve a fair outcome for 
patentees, one might think the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine 
like the contract law doctrine of promissory estoppel.256 They could be 
forgiven for doing so.  
Courts have noted that the doctrine is “designed to do equity” and “to 
relieve an inventor from a semantic strait jacket.”257 In its own jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court focused on both the inventor’s merit and the defendants’ 
bad motives.258 The law, was, and remains, vague about the nature and extent 
“merit” and “bad motives” played, and when they outweigh the need to 
provide the public clear notice of the patent’s scope.    
The jurisprudence, however, seems to tilt toward a general notion of fair 
play rather than judges being empowered to intervene when the strict legal 
result causes injustice.259 First, courts have no discretion to invoke the doctrine 
to remedy a seemingly unjust result.260 In contrast, patentees may generally do 
so whether or not they show any merit in an equitable sense.261 Second, judges 
never employed the doctrine independently of juries.262 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court forbade a “judicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing 
application of the doctrine of equivalents.”263 At the same time, as seen in Part 
 
255 Moorhead, supra note 26, at 1428 (noting that “the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable 
doctrine.”). But see Reavill, supra note 11, at 320 (“Recent debate, however, has questioned the 
way in which the doctrine approaches the principles of equity.”); see also Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d 
at 1539–43 (Plager, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen there is a wrong for which there is no adequate 
remedy at law, equity courts have traditionally gone beyond the law to impose a just and equitable 
result. Thus in those special cases in which the competitor's product is literally different but the 
difference is so insubstantial as to constitute a ‘fraud on the patent,’ a court in the exercise of its 
extraordinary equity power may extend the remedy of infringement in order to protect the rights 
of the patentee granted by law.”). See also id. at 1545 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
doctrine's weighing various factors is an equitable determination for a judge.). 
256 See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678 (1984). 
257 Perkin–Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at 1532.  
258 Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1966. 
259 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521 (“[I]n doctrine of equivalents cases, this court's allusions to 
equity invoke equity in its broadest sense—equity as general fairness. While recognizing the 
equity, or fairness, promoted by the doctrine of equivalents[.]”). Holbrook, supra note 52, at 5 
(“The express purpose of [the doctrine of equivalents] is to ensure fair and adequate protection to 
the patentee and to solidify the patent incentive.”). 
260 Id. “By referring to the doctrine as a doctrine of fairness, neither the Supreme Court nor this 
court has invoked the myriad implications of an alternative to legal remedies. In addition, neither 
the Supreme Court nor this court has invoked equity in the technical sense of a set of principles 
originating in England to compensate for the historically harsh rules of common law.” Hilton 
Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.  
261 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521; Holbrook, supra note 52, at 5.  
262 See id.  
263 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 34. 
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II, courts are generally uncomfortable with giving juries more leeway than 
necessary to determine patent infringement.264 Some commentators have even 
expressed discomfort with juries adjudicating even on the lesser “fair play” 
interpretation of the doctrine.265 
Third, intent generally plays little role in the doctrine’s application. 
Infringement does not turn on defendants’ desire to infringe nor their 
knowledge of the patent.266 Commentators have expressed that equitable 
triggers like copying and design-arounds provides juries “with a facade behind 
which it can factor in evidence of intent.”267  
However, others have argued that intent may be the only distinction 
between copying per se and copying to design around even though in both 
instances, the differences may be equally insubstantial (or substantial) in a 
technical sense. Copying steals the patented idea directly, and necessarily 
requires intent.268 Evidence of copying may suggest that differences between 
the claimed and accused device are insubstantial.269 Conversely, evidence of 
defendants’ attempts to “design around” patented claims may be exculpatory 
“because there is a presumption that one of ordinary skill in the art would 
design substantial changes into the new product to avoid infringement.”270       
Moreover, intent to copy and its absence were of substantial importance 
to the Supreme Court. It taught that “[w]ithout some explanation or indication 
that [the accused device] was developed by independent research, the trial 
court could properly infer that the accused [device] is the result of imitation 
rather than experimentation or invention.”271 That statement has not been 
expressly overruled and cases continue to teach that intent remains an 
important consideration, particularly where they take the form of copying, 
designing around, pioneer inventions, and independent development.272 
Defendants’ intent can thus help courts filter patentees who genuinely deserve 
a second stab at proving infringement, and the doctrine loses both its equitable 
 
264 Reavill, supra note 11, at 320 (indicating that “[d]iscontent with the focus of equivalency 
analysis, and especially with the roles that juries and intent play in that analysis, has divided the 
patent community.”). 
265 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1178 ( “a fairness doctrine juries apply, is arguably inconsistent with 
a patent system premised on predictability and on clear prior notice of the scope of rights.”).  
266 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 35 (stating that “[a]pplication of the doctrine of equivalents, 
therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof of intent.”). 
267 Reavill, supra note 11, at 357.  
268 See e.g. Keith A. Robb, Note, Hilton Davis and the Doctrine of Equivalents—An Insubstantial 
Difference, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 275, 282 (1996).  
269 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519. 
270 Folker, supra note 14, at 218.  
271 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 612. 
272 Reavill, supra note 11, at 355–56. 
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nature and its justification.273 For instance, if copying were the sole basis for 
invoking the doctrine, it would prevent it from “becoming the second prong 
of every patent infringement charge.”274 The better view then is that intent, 
like any other probative evidence, should go to the weight and not to 
admissibility.  
Of the 316 cases in the dataset, most (72.7%) did not mention equity in 
any form (Figure 5). Of the cases that did, those that found for patentees and 
defendants were about evenly split (Figure 6), with 45.3% finding for 
patentees and 51.1% finding for infringers. This suggests that the equitable 
nature of the case as such did not dominate the outcome of cases in the dataset. 
Similarly, of the 27.2% that discussed equitable triggers, half found for the 
defendant, and the other half for the patentee (Figure 7). Any correlation is 
therefore equivocal at best. Within each type of equitable trigger, however, 
patentees did best with copying (60.0%) compared with design-around and 
independent inventions (40.0%). Over time, both copying and design-
arounds/independent invention were present and took turns to dominate as the 
most common equitable trigger (Figure 8). There was only one case that 
discussed pioneer inventions and no meaningful conclusion can be drawn 
there except that those cases are exceedingly rare.   
 
 
Figure 5: Prominence of  DOE as an Equitable Doctrine 
 
273 Id.  at 358 (“Consideration of intent should take into account whether the accused device is the 
result of independent development (involving no copying), copying in order to design around the 
patented device (involving a constructive employment of copying and respect for the patent 
system), or copying in order to pirate the patented device (involving a subversive employment of 
copying in an effort to circumvent the patent system).”). 
274 Moorhead, supra note 26, at 1447. 
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Figure 6: Whether Discussion on Equity Affected Outcome 
 
 
Figure 7: Outcome (By Equitable Triggers)  
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Figure 8: Equitable Triggers (Over Time) 
A. Copying 
The Supreme Court intended the doctrine to protect patentees from 
“piracy,” “fraud,” and “stealing.”275 Evidence of copying suggested that the 
differences were insubstantial.276 The doctrine tolerates copying as an 
intermediate step to designing around the patent.277 However the defendant 
must ensure that the new device does more than just narrowly escape the 
claim.278 Rather, the necessary difference approximates what defendants show 
to avoid infringement.279 One empirical study found most infringers did not 
copy the patented invention and some even did not have knowledge of the 
patent. This suggests that courts’ use of claim construction coupled with literal 
infringement was the better basis for reflecting the reality of this “no-fault” 
infringement.280    
 
275 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 612 (Black, J., dissenting). 
276 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519. 
277 Id. at 1520. 
278 See Paul N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Impact on “Designing Around,” 4 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 315, 315–16, 320–21 (1994). 
279 Robb, supra note 268, at 282. 
280 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008).  
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The issue of copying was most prominent in 2009, with patentees 
sweeping all wins that year (Figure 9). Patentees won 63.6% of cases 
involving copying. Overall, copying has not been prominent, comprising 7.9% 
of all cases compared with design-arounds (9.49%), and surpassing only the 
pioneer invention cases (0.6%). It appears that rivalry plays an important role 
in copying cases, with patentees twice as likely to win against a rival than 
against a non-rival (Figure 10). 
Figure 9: Outcome Over Time (Copying Only) 
 
Figure 10: Whether defendant’s identity as rival affected outcome (Copying 
only) 
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One reason for the connection between outcomes for rivals versus non-
rivals may be the “known interchangeability” factor. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence teaches that an “important factor” to consider in any equivalents 
analysis is “whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known 
of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one 
that was.”281 Where “known interchangeability” was an issue in the case, 
patentees prevailed 43.5% of the time (Figure 11), which is significantly 
higher than the average patentee win rate in doctrine of equivalents cases 
studied (32.6%).  
Figure 11: “Known Interchangeability” (Outcome) 
B. Design-Arounds & Independent Invention 
Leapfrogging is the basis for design-arounds and independent invention 
being exculpatory factors courts consider when looking into the substantiality 
of differences.282 Rivals may consciously attempt to avoid the patented 
invention to advance the state-of-the-art and fuel the kind of dynamic 
competition that characterizes the patent system.283 Independent development 
occurs when rivals produce their devices without knowledge or notice of the 
patented device.284 The Supreme Court regards both favorably, with the 
former creating a suggestion that the differences may in fact be substantial.285 
 
281 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
282 See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1532 (Newman, J., concurring) (“If minor improvements are likely 
to be captured by the doctrine of equivalents, this might cause the would-be competitor to move 
to diverging areas instead of simply tagging along at the periphery of the patentee’s claims.)”; see 
also id. at 1532-33 (Newman, J., concurring) (encouraging “leapfrogging” advances as opposed 
to substantial imitation).  
283 Id. at 1520.  
284 See Robb, supra note 268, at 282. 
285 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520 (noting that designing around will affect the substantiality of 
differences while independent development will have no such effect). 
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However, since independent does not exonerate invention infringement, 
commentators guess that the exculpation was dictated by the doctrine’s 
purpose of discouraging “theft.”286 Conversely, the absence of independent 
research meant courts could “infer that the accused flux is the result of 
imitation rather than experimentation or invention.”287 Like copying, 
patentees were very successful in 2009 before dipping precipitously in 2010 
and never really recovered relative to defendants (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Outcome Over Time (Design-Around Independent Invention 
Only) 
 
Figure 12 shows that patentees do comparatively better than defendants 
in cases involving design-arounds and independent invention compared to 
copying cases. Patentees win 40.0% of these cases here compared with 
copying cases (63.2%) seen earlier. Within the design-arounds and 
independent invention, however, the defendants performed consistently better 
than patentees (40.0% for patentees compared to 60.0% for defendants). 
Moreover, Figure 13 shows that the accused infringer, who was not a rival, 
was significantly more likely to prevail against a patentee than if the parties 
were rivals (75.0% versus 54.5%). This is consistent with the view that the 
doctrine’s purpose is to protect the patentee from copyists, and not innovators. 
 
 
 
286 Glitzenstein, supra note 16, at 289 (stating that “[t]here could have been no theft in fact if the 
accused product was the fruit of independent research and development.”).  
287 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 612. 
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Figure 13: Whether defendant’s identity as rival affected outcome (Design-
Around Independent Invention only) 
C. Pioneer Inventions 
Courts may look at whether the invention was a pioneer in its field. The 
Supreme Court authorized the use of broad claiming language for pioneering 
inventions that applied to later-arising technologies when courts apply the 
doctrine of equivalents.288 “Pioneer status” depends on whether the invention 
makes a significant technological advance in the field.289 If so, the invention 
would in theory enjoy a broader range of equivalents than non-pioneer 
inventions and because the invention inherently has greater potential 
embodiment scope.290 This is because in a new field with little prior art, the 
gap between the claimed invention and the prior art will be significant without 
any expansion potentially ensnaring the prior art.291 This privilege may stem 
from the principle that the inventor who has enabled a vast improvement in 
the useful arts should be rewarded commensurately. In contrast, non-pioneer 
inventions improve existing inventions, usually in a crowded field.292 Pioneer 
 
288 See e.g. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 207 (1894) (“If the invention is broad or 
primary in its character, the range of equivalents will be correspondingly broad, under the liberal 
construction which the courts give to such inventions.”); Perkin-Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at 1532 
(“A pioneer invention is entitled to a broad range of equivalents.”).  
289 See Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561–62 (1898) (“To what 
liberality of construction these claims are entitled depends to a certain extent upon the character 
of the invention, and whether it is what is termed, in ordinary parlance a ‘pioneer.’ This word, 
although used somewhat loosely, is commonly understood to denote a patent covering a function 
never before performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark 
a distinct step in the progress of the art, as distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection 
of what had gone before.”). 
290 Computing Scale Co. v. Automatic Scale Co., 204 U.S. 609 (1907).  
291 Tex. Instruments, Inc., 805 F.2d at 1572. 
292 Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 963. 
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inventions are also often commercialized more slowly, so the doctrine “may 
be socially desirable because it avoids high-cost refinement that might 
otherwise occur.”293 Finally, pioneer status protects inventors “when the 
invention is in a field that is changing rapidly in a way that creates high 
refinement costs because of the high cost of predicting imitative strategies that 
might be used by competitors.”294 The doctrine pegs patent scope to 
technological advancement since equivalents are evaluated at the time of 
infringement, not the time of invention, filing, or issuance.295 
In practice, determining whether an invention deserved a “pioneer” 
status was done on an ad hoc basis. Every invention was unique, diluting the 
value of precedent.296 Even when a court accepted that the invention was a 
pioneering one, determining an appropriate range of equivalents proved to be 
another hurdle.  Some judges treat pioneer inventors more generously,297 while 
others rejected the contention that invention was a pioneer entitled to a broad 
range of equivalents.298 This makes it difficult to design operable jury 
instructions.299    
Commentators have observed “[t]he role of the status of the invention in 
doctrine of equivalents analysis is uncertain, if any role exists at all.”300 The 
Federal Circuit has not uniformly addressed the issue. Some opinions are still 
written under the principle that a pioneer invention is “entitled to a broad range 
of equivalents.”301 Recent Federal Circuit decisions have downplayed that 
benefit pioneer status brings to patentees invoking the doctrine.302 When the 
 
293 Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1995. 
294 Id. 
295 See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 37 (1997) (“Insofar as the question under the doctrine 
of equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to claimed element, the proper time 
for evaluating equivalency--and thus knowledge of interchangeability between elements--is at the 
time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.”). 
296 Ted Baker, Pioneers in Technology: A Proposed System for Classifying and Rewarding 
Extraordinary Inventions, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 449 (2003).  
297 Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257–61. See also Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 2001 
n.254 (“Critics of Corning read this case as ignoring the all-elements rule in favor of the holistic 
approach to the [doctrine].”).  
298 Universal Gym Equip. Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equip. Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 
1987).  
299 See Baker, supra note 296, at 453–54 (“Even the classification of an invention as a pioneer is 
a challenge within the current system. The standards that serve as the basis for this classification 
are inconsistent and vague.”); see also id. at 453 (“Perhaps the most logical approach is to define 
‘substantially the same’ more liberally when the range of equivalents is expanded, but since the 
jury has no way to know where the baseline for substantial similarity exists, a modification of that 
baseline is likely to be meaningless.”).  
300 Hofmann, Jr., supra note 140, at 1058. 
301 Perkin-Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
302 See, e.g, Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See 
also Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
490 U.S. 1068 (1989) (“It is not necessary, of course, that an inventor be entitled to a broad claim 
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patentee’s assertion that its patent was a pioneering technology, the Federal 
Circuit responded that classification was irrelevant to its infringement 
analysis.303 The court explained that if earlier cases treated inventions at issue 
differently, those differences stemmed from the sparseness of relevant prior 
art rather than a “manifestation of a different legal standard based on an 
abstract legal concept.”304 Trial courts have also disregarded the invention 
pioneer status altogether, with one dismissing it as “ancient jurisprudence.”305   
In looking at trends over time, cases involving design-arounds and 
independent invention dominated the first two years, with cases involving 
copying playing a significantly more prominent role between 2012 – 2018. 
Despite having memorable policy justifications, cases involving pioneer 
inventions were in fact rare, with only one case out of 316 over the 10-year 
period. This shows that the prominence of a doctrine might not translate into 
it being prominent in real life, validating the view by one commentator that  
[t]he practical difficulties of classifying pioneer inventions and 
providing them with expanded protection, combined with the Federal 
Circuit's reluctance to apply a different standard to pioneer inventions, 
leave little incentive for modern patent holders to argue for pioneer 
status. Therefore, it is not surprising that the merits of patented 
inventions are rarely assessed in modern case law.306   
That revelation is one of many reasons why evidence-based studies are 
valuable.   
Means-plus-function claims allow patentees to describe devices whose 
components could have many embodiments, by pointing to what the device 
does and which covers all the similar structures.307 Literal infringement occurs 
when the accused device has the same structure and performs the same 
function recited in the limitation using the structure disclosed in the 
specification.308 It allows courts to look at the allegedly infringing device to 
see if its elements are equivalent to the patented structure, even if not identical. 
For example, a claim may call for parts A and B to be secured, and that parts 
A and B are made of wood secured by nails. An accused device that uses 
screws or adhesive would perform the identical specified function and would 
literally infringe as long as it performs exactly the same function.        
 
covering all possible products in a line of products before a court may award an invention pioneer 
status, or a range of equivalents sufficient to encompass a particular accused product.”).  
303 Tex. Instruments, Inc., 846 F.2d at 1370.  
304 Id.  
305 Sun Studs, Inc., 872 F.2d at 987. See also Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at n.7.  
306 Baker, supra note 296, at 454.  
307 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2007).  
308 Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 
1993).  
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In contrast, infringement under the doctrine includes equivalents not 
detailed in the specification as well. However, it limits equivalence to 
technologies developed after the patent is granted.309 This is because doctrines 
like prosecution history estoppel and the public dedication doctrine prevent 
patentees from asserting equivalence if it could have been included in the 
patent, unless the element in the accused device is the result of a technological 
advance. This is because that variant “may be developed after the patent is 
granted . . . [and] based on after-developed technology, could not have been 
disclosed in the patent.”310 Like other inquiries under the doctrine, the 
applicable range also depends on “the pioneer or non-pioneer status of the 
invention, the prosecution history and the prior art.”311 
In the context of the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit read 
Section 112(f) to impose a temporal restriction on the meaning and application 
of functional claim terms, restricting them from after-arising technologies.312 
Courts limit claims to structural technologies embodying the identically 
claimed function known at the time of filing to perform the function and to be 
equivalent to structural embodiments of that function disclosed in the 
specification.313 
 The Allison-Lemley study found 18.2% of all cases involved the 
“means-plus-function” claims.314 Patentees won in 5.3% cases, which they 
attribute to “a smaller role for the doctrine of equivalents.”315 The dataset 
reveals that 10.9% of all cases involved the “means-plus-function” claims, a 
fall of about one-half. This may have been due to more patentees relying on 
literal infringement rather than the doctrine. The dataset also reveals that 
patentees won in 24.5% of the cases, perhaps reflecting that patentees are 
choosing to invoke the doctrine in more meritorious cases (Figure 14). 
 
309 Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
310 Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 
1998).  
311 D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
312 Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc., 145 F.3d at 1310 (“The doctrine of equivalents is 
necessary because one cannot predict the future. Due to technological advances, a variant of an 
invention may be developed after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so 
insubstantial a change from what is claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an 
infringement. Such a variant, based on after-developed technology, could not have been disclosed 
in the patent. Even if such an element is found not to be a § 112, ¶ 6, equivalent because it is not 
equivalent to the structure disclosed in the patent, this analysis should not foreclose it from being 
an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents.”). 
313 Al-Site Corp., 174 F.3d at 1320 (“[E]quivalent structure or act under § 112 cannot embrace 
technology developed after the issuance of the patent because the literal meaning of a claim is 
fixed upon its issuance. An 'after arising equivalent'  infringes, if at all, under the doctrine of 
equivalents.”).   
314 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 975.  
315 Id. at 976.   
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Figure 14: Outcome (Over Time, MPF claims only) 
III. LIMITATIONS 
Courts erected four bars to the doctrine of equivalents: prosecution 
history estoppel, the “all-elements” rule, the prior art bar, and the public 
dedication rule.316 Like prosecution history estoppel, each penalizes patentees 
“for sloppy or overly aggressive patent drafting and for strategic behaviors 
that shift the cost of information about the legal scope of an invention from an 
inventor to the Patent Office and the public.”317 Former Chief Judge Michel 
remarked that “lawyers often overlook these potential bars.”318  
Figure 15 shows the distribution of judicial limitations to the doctrine, 
with prosecution history estoppel dominating (49.2%) of cases discussing 
limitations, followed by the “all-elements” rule (31.5%), prior art bar (10.9%), 
and public dedication rule (8.5%). About half of the cases did not mention any 
limitations to the doctrine, which is surprising considering their prominence 
in the literature but consistent with former Chief Judge Michael’s observation. 
By comparison the Allison-Lemley study’s breakdown was as follows: 
prosecution history estoppel (37.8%), the “all-elements” rule (36.6%), and the 
public dedication rule (2.9%).319  
 
316 MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 783 (5th ed. 2019). 
317 Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, supra note 93, at 927. 
318 Michel, supra note 23, at 127. 
319 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 982. Most cases do not distinguish between amendment-
based estoppel and argument-based estoppel in prosecution history estoppel cases. Neither does 
the dataset. For a list of cases in the dataset discussing one or both these forms of estoppel, see 
Pharma Tech Solutions Inc. v. LifeScan Inc., 348 F.Supp.3d 1076 (2018), Alfred E. Mann Found. 
for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2015), Medtronic Navigation, 
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Figure 16 shows the continued dominance of prosecution history 
estoppel over time, with the “all-elements” rule surpassing it only briefly in 
2013. The prior art bar and publication dedication bar have remained 
consistently low over time. 
 
Figure 15: Distribution of Limitations to DOE 
 
 
 
Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 603 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010), LG 
Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 798 F.Supp.2d 541 (2011), MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson 
& Johnson, 638 F.Supp.2d 987 (2009), Paone v. Microsoft Corp., 881 F.Supp.2d 386 (2012), 
Zircon Corp. v. Stanley Works, 713 F.Supp.2d 881 (2010), Intendis GMBH v. Glenmark 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA, 822 F.3d 1355 (2016).   This Article also treats “all-elements” and 
claim vitiation cases identically for coding purposes. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S., at 39 
n.8 (1997) (“Vitiation” is not an exception to the doctrine of equivalents, but instead a legal 
determination that “the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two elements to 
be equivalent.”). 
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Figure 16: DOE Limitations (Over Time) 
 
The dataset showed that patentees fared best with the prior art bar 
(51.9%) compared to the public dedication rule (38.1%), prosecution history 
estoppel (36.9%) the “all-elements” rule (30.8%) (Figure 17). By comparison 
the Allison-Lemley study’s breakdown was as follows: prosecution history 
estoppel (26.9%), the public dedication rule (25.0%), and the “all-elements” 
rule (17.9%).320 Compared with the 1999 – 2005 period, patentees in the 2009 
– 2018 period fared better with the prior art bar, but worse in all other 
categories. This result may have been due to the interaction of validity and 
other doctrines, the precise correlation of which would be a rich subject for 
future study.   
As a question of law, these limitations enable judges to enter summary 
judgments of non-infringement in favor of defendants, protecting them from 
baseless patent infringement claims.321 The data reveals that summary 
judgments did indeed dominate all other procedural postures (Figure 18). 
 
 
320 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 982. 
321 Meurer & Nard, supra note 2, at 1999.  
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Figure 17: DOE Limitations (Outcome) 
 
Figure 18: Procedural Posture (Outcome, “Not Mentioned” Filtered 
Out) 
A. Prosecution History Estoppel 
Commentators call the Federal Circuit’s inability to articulate a 
workable standard for prosecution history estoppel its “single largest 
failing.”322 While the Supreme Court appeared to have settled on a position 
favoring patentees, who have the opportunity to rebut a presumptive surrender 
of claim scope, commentators noted that in reality, the burden “has been very 
 
322 Strawbridge, McDonald & Moy, supra note 85, at 888–89. 
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difficult for patentees to overcome.”323 According to them, the key obstacle 
patentees face is showing that the equivalent was “unforeseeable.” 
Equivalents are “foreseeable” even if one of ordinary skill in the art would not 
recognize that it was an equivalent or view it as acceptable for use in the 
invention at the time the application is filed so long as the variant existed at 
the time of the application.324 This requires patentees to “reach beyond 
conventional knowledge when filing an application or amendment to 
anticipate all potential uses of extant technologies that may be relevant to the 
claimed invention.”325 The problem, as Judge Newman has argued, is that 
patentees may not fully appreciate extant technology until a later date.326 One 
commentator noted “[t]his in itself would be rare, and it would be rarer still 
that the applicant, aware of such an alternative, would have failed to claim it 
in the first instance. An alternative would be foreseeable only in the limited 
circumstances where the alternative was inadvertently omitted and was a 
candidate for a reissue patent.”327 
The Article reported on outcomes over time. Figure 19 shows defendants 
performing significantly better than patentees across the almost entire 10-year 
period, with two notable peaks between 2009 – 2011, and 2014 – 2015. 
Patentees finally managed to turn things around toward 2017 – 2018, but 
whether they can sustain that trend remains to be seen.  
 
 
323 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1177.  
324 Holbrook, supra note 52, at 23 (“The Federal Circuit has since made foreseeability an even 
more stringent standard, rendering rebuttal of the Festo presumption effectively impossible unless 
the asserted equivalent is solely the result of later-developed technology.”). 
325 Id. at 24. 
326 Festo Corp., 493 F.3d at 1384 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
327 Holbrook, supra note 52, at 25.  
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Figure 19: Outcome Over Time (PHE Only) 
 
The Article also reported on the exceptions to the application of 
prosecution history estoppel. Figure 20 reveals why patentees lost during those 
years. It turns out that all three exceptions to prosecution history estoppel had 
little to do with the outcome. Surprisingly, most of the cases did not even 
discuss any of the exceptions. One explanation for this is that defendants 
invoking the prosecution history estoppel during those periods simply 
survived having their motions quashed by summary judgement. Indeed, the 
graph showing a trend of procedural posture over time confirms this, with 
summary judgments by defendants being the dominant procedural posture 
over most of the period studied (Figure 21).   
 
Figure 20: Outcome over time (PHE Exceptions) 
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Figure 21: Posture over time (PHE Exceptions) 
Two-thirds of the cases that discussed prosecution history estoppel did 
not consider any of the exceptions (Figure 22). About a quarter (27.3%) 
discussed tangentiality, only about a sixteenth (6.6%) discussed foreseeability, 
and no cases discussed “some other reason.” Given that patentees routinely 
amend claims to avoid prior art during prosecution, it is unsurprising that 
tangentiality, a rebuttal mapped to precisely that activity, should dominate the 
three exceptions to prosecution history estoppel. It is also unsurprising that 
unforeseeability is rarely invoked to rebut prosecution history estoppel, since 
as noted earlier, conventional wisdom already teaches that it is an uphill battle. 
No other empirical study has reported on these results, so there is no basis for 
intemporal comparison. 
 
Figure 22: Outcome over time (PHE Exceptions) 
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B. “All-elements” Rule 
The Allison-Lemley study found patentees won 17.9% of the cases 
involving the all-elements rule between 1999 – 2004.328 The Article reveals 
that between 2009 – 2018 patentees won in 30.4% of cases, doing significantly 
better in showing that every limitation of the patent was found on the accused 
device. However, as with prosecution history estoppel, patentees generally 
fared worse than defendants. Intriguingly the 2009 – 2011 peak for defendant 
wins manifest again, with another peak in 2013 (Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23: Outcome (Over Time, “all-elements” rule only) 
C. Prior Art Bar 
The prior art limits patentees to a scope that avoids prior art.329 The test 
is whether the Patent Office would have allowed the equivalent in a 
hypothetical claim over the prior art.330 It applies whether a single piece of 
prior art anticipates the equivalent or whether one or more pieces of prior art 
would together render that equivalent obvious.331 As with prosecution history 
 
328 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 975. 
329 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(“[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which he 
could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims.”). 
330 Id. at 684; Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Sys., 175 F.3d 974, 982 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (excluding 
equivalents “obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art” at the time of invention).  
331 Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (prior art would 
make the accused product obvious).  
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estoppel and the all-elements rule, the prior art rule is a legal question for the 
trial judge, and reviewed de novo.332  
While the Allison-Lemley study omitted the prior art bar inexplicably, 
this study reports that patentees prevailed in 51.9% of cases, by far the best 
among the limitations. One reason for this is that patent applicants must 
navigate prior art arguments as a matter of course and are comparatively more 
skilled at surviving defendant summary judgment motions seeking to stop 
them from advancing their cause using the doctrine. Figure 24 shows that a 
picture of patentee markedly higher wins over time compared with the earlier 
two limitations to the doctrine, with patentee dominating at about half the 
period studied, a result consistent with the percent-win figure.    
 
Figure 24: Outcome (Over Time, Prior art rule only) 
D. Public Dedication Rule 
The Federal Circuit articulated the public dedication rule in 2002. It 
teaches that “when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject 
matter, as in this case, this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to 
the public.”333 Like prosecution history estoppel, the rule protects public 
reliance on patentees surrendering its patent scope during patent prosecution 
either gratuitously or so that they would obtain the patents.334  
The Patent Office does not look at equivalents of a claimed invention 
when determining patentability, so narrow claims attract a more limited 
 
332 Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 904 F.2d at 683.  
333 Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1054. 
334 Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, supra note 93, at 927. 
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universe of potentially invalidating prior art.335 Thus if a patentee possessed a 
variation of the claimed invention, or if a skilled person in the art would 
understand that variation from the patent, then the patentee’s failure to claim 
it would cause it to fall into the public domain.336 This rule discourages 
patentees from filing broad disclosures and attempting to then circumvent 
examination by presenting only narrow claims and resorting to the doctrine of 
equivalents to capture the broader disclosure. 
The Allison-Lemley study showed the public dedication rule played a 
much more minor role compared to the other three limitations. It was raised 
only twelve times, and the patentee won 25% of those cases.337 The Article 
reports eighteen instances, with the patentee faring better, winning 38.1% of 
those cases. As with prosecution history estoppel and the “all-elements” rule, 
patentee wins rallied in the later period of the dataset (Figure 25).     
 
Figure 25: Outcome (Over Time, Public Dedication rule only) 
CONCLUSIONS 
Patent law is designed to promote the progress of the “useful Arts.”338 
The doctrine of equivalents achieves this constitutional end by providing both 
effective protection to inventors and adequate notice to the public.  It enhances 
the scope of patent claims by giving courts flexibility to expand them at the 
cost of undermining the notice function of patent claims. Over the past 
century, few patent issues have been considered so often by the Supreme Court 
 
335 Id. 
336 PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“This 
[public dedication] rule does not mean that any generic reference in a written specification 
necessarily dedicates all members of that particular genus to the public. The disclosure must be 
of such specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the subject matter that had 
been disclosed and not claimed.”). 
337 Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 975. 
338 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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as the doctrine of equivalents. Courts, patent attorneys, and legal scholars have 
wrestled with operationalizing the doctrine of equivalents for nearly 150 years. 
 This Article provides both a doctrinal and an empirical basis for judges, 
scholars, policymakers, and patent attorneys to better understand the 
doctrine’s nature in order to contextualize its evolution and chart its future. 
This Article also traces the doctrine’s origins and delves into the heart of its 
policy tensions, including the reasons for the doctrine’s incoherence as well 
as tension between judges and juries. Furthermore, this Article presents the 
first empirical study on “equitable triggers” such as copying and pioneer 
inventions and investigates limits such as prosecution history estoppel. In 
doing so, this study contributes to evidence-based decision in patent law and 
policy by filling a significant gap in the literature.  
 
